- Preface
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- I.I - Concerning the nature of the will
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- I.II - Concerning the determination of the Will
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- I.III - Concerning the meaning of the terms Necessity, Impossibility, Inability, etc.; and of Contingence
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- I.IV - Of the distinction of natural and moral necessity and inability
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- I.V - Concerning the notion of liberty, and of moral agency
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- II.I - Showing the manifest inconsistence of the Arminian notion of liberty of will, consisting in the will's self-determining power
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- II.II - Several supposed ways of evading the foregoing reasoning considered
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- II.III - Whether any event whatsoever, and volition in particular, can come to pass without a cause of its existence
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- II.IV - Whether volition can arise without a cause, through the activity of the nature of the soul
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- II.V - Showing, that if the things asserted in these evasions should be supposed to be true, they are altogether impertinent, and can't help the cause of Arminian liberty; and how (this being the state of the case) Arminian writers are obliged to talk inconsistently
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- II.VI - Concerning the will's determining in things which are perfectly indifferent, in the view of the mind
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- II.VII - Concerning the notion of liberty of will consisting in indifference
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- II.VIII - Concerning the supposed liberty of the will, as opposite to all necessity
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- II.IX - Of the connection of the acts of the will with the dictates of the understanding
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- II.X - Volition necessarily connected with the influence of motives; with particular observations on the great inconsistence of Mr. Chubb's assertions and reasonings, about the freedom of the will
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- II.XI - The evidence of God's certain foreknowledge of the volitions of moral agents
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- II.XII - God's certain foreknowledge of the future volitions of moral agents, inconsistent with such a contingence of those volitions, as is without all necessity
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- II.XIII - Whether we suppose the volitions of moral agents to be connected with anything antecedent, or not, yet they must be necessary in such a sense as to overthrow Arminian liberty
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- III.I - God's moral excellency necessary, yet virtuous and praiseworthy
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- III.II - The acts of the will of the human soul of Jesus Christ necessarily holy, yet truly virtuous, praiseworthy, rewardable, etc.
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- III.III - The case of such as are given up of god to sin, and of fallen man in general, proves moral necessity and inability to be consistent with blameworthiness
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- III.IV - Command, and obligation to obedience, consistent with moral inability to obey
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- III.V - That sincerity of desires and endeavors, which is supposed to excuse in the nonperformance of things in themselves good, particularly considered
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- III.VI - Liberty of indifference, not only not necessary to virtue, but utterly inconsistent with it; and all, either virtuous or vicious habits or inclinations, inconsistent with Arminian notions of liberty and moral agency
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- III.VII - Arminian notions of moral agency inconsistent with all influence of motive and inducement, in either virtuous or vicious actions
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